(/) A stern cutting down of non-essential imports ; and

(g) A considerable increase in home supplies of food, timber and ore—coupled with a reduction in consumption.

The measures taken under (#), *(c)*, *(d)*, *(e)*, (/) and *(g)* will be related in other chapters. I propose now to

Convoy ^ea^ w^^ t^ie stO]t 7 °^ t^ie amaz*ng anc* *system:* incomprehensible difficulties encountered *opposition of* In inducing the Admiralty even to try the *A* Admiralty* convoy system. I take this first because it was the expedient which, when it was ultimately adopted, had the most immediate and ultimate effect in reducing the sinkings. It was also the plan which roused the most implacable and prolonged resistance on the part of the Admiralty. It is especially difficult to understand their prejudices in this respect, because after Trafalgar the main function of our ships-of-war was to convoy our merchant vessels through seas infested with French privateers. Convoying was therefore in accordance with the traditions of our Navy in its greatest days.

The first effort made to overcome their blind obstinacy had occurred on 2nd November, 1916, at a War Committee attended by Admiral Sir Henry Jackson, who was then First Sea Lord, and Vice-Admiral Sir H. F. Oliver, then Chief of the War Staff at the Admiralty. Sir John Jellicoe left the Grand

Fleet and travelled specially to London at the Prime Minister's request to attend this meeting. The question of submarine attacks by gunfire on merchant ships was considered, and a statement was made as to the increase in the loss to Allied and Neutral merchant ships due to submarine activity. It was